Recently, several new techniques were presented to dramatically improve key parts of secure two-party computation (2PC) protocols that use the cut-and-choose paradigm on garbled circuits for 2PC with security against malicious adversaries. These include techniques for reducing the number of garbled circuits (Lindell 13, Huang et al. 13, Lindell and Riva 14, Huang et al. 14) and techniques for reducing the overheads besides garbled circuits (Mohassel and Riva 13, Shen and Shelat 13).
INTRODUCTION
Secure two-party computation enables a pair of parties with private inputs to compute a joint function of their inputs. The computation should maintain privacy (meaning that the legitimate output but nothing else is revealed), correctness (meaning that the output is correctly computed), and more. These properties should be * Supported by the European Research Council under the ERC consolidators grant agreement n. 615172 (HIPS), and by the BIU Center for Research in Applied Cryptography and Cyber Security in conjunction with the Israel National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minster's Office.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. CCS '15, October 12-16, 2015 , Denver, Colorado, USA. maintained even if one of the parties is corrupted. The feasibility of secure computation was demonstrated in the 1980s, where it was shown that any probabilistic polynomial-time functionality can be securely computed [32, 13] .
The goal of constructing efficient secure two-party (2PC) computation protocols in the presence of malicious adversaries has been an active area of research in the recent years. One of the most popular approaches for constructing such protocols is based on applying the cut-and-choose technique to Yao's garbled-circuit protocol. In this technique, one of the parties prepares many garbled circuits, and the other asks to open a random subset of them in order to verify that they are correct; the parties then evaluate the remaining, unchecked circuits. This forces the party generating the garbled circuits to make most of them correct, or it will be caught cheating (solving perhaps the biggest problem in applying Yao's protocol to the malicious setting, which is that an incorrect garbled circuit that computes the wrong function cannot be distinguished from a correct garbled circuit). Many different works 2PC protocols have been designed based on this approach [24, 20, 22, 29, 14, 19, 25, 30] , and several implementations have been presented to study the concrete efficiency of it in practice (e.g. [27, 29, 17, 30, 2] ). In this work we focus on the cut-and-choose approach.
The number of garbled circuits. Let s be a statistical security parameter such that the probability that a malicious party can cheat should be bounded by 2 −s (plus a function that is negligible in n, where n is the computational security parameter). Then, the exact number of garbled circuits needed for achieving this bound was reduced in the past years from 17s [20] , to approximately 3s [20, 29] , and recently to s [19] .
In [15, 23] , it was shown that if multiple 2PC executions are needed, then the amortized number of garbled circuits per 2PC can be reduced even below s (i.e., for N 2PC executions, only O( s log N ) garbled circuits are needed per 2PC). In addition, [15, 23] present protocols that work in the online/offline setting, where most of the computation and communication intensive steps are carried out in the offline stage, resulting in a very efficient online stage.
Checking input consistency. Running cut-and-choose itself does not suffice for obtaining a secure protocol since it only deals with the correctness of the garbled circuits. To make the protocol secure, we must additionally include mechanisms for ensuring that the party that prepares the garbled circuits (a) uses the same input in all the evaluated garbled circuits, and (b) provides correct inputs to the OTs for the other party to learn the input labels for its input. We refer to the first problem as P 1 's input consistency check and the second as preventing a selective OT attack. (We note that it is easy to ensure that the party P 2 who evaluates the garbled circuits uses the same input in all circuits, by running a single OT for each bit of P 2 's input for all circuits being evaluated. We therefore do not refer to this problem further.)
It is possible to check the consistency of P 1 's input using O(s 2 ) inexpensive (symmetric) cryptographic operations per input bit [24, 20] , but this results in huge communication. Alternate solutions using O(s) exponentiations per input bit were presented in [22, 29] ; this reduces the communication size while significantly increasing the computation time. Recently, [30, 25] presented solutions that require only O(s) inexpensive (symmetric) cryptographic operations per input bit, resulting in only a minor overhead on top of the cut-and-choose protocol itself (as it already requires O(s) gates per input bit). Implementations of cut-and-choose based 2PC. The first implementation which evaluated the cut-and-choose approach in practice was [27] . In [29, 30] , implementations with additional algorithmic improvements were presented. Both results focus on reducing the overheads of the input-consistency checks, and work with approximately 3s garbled circuits for soundness 2 −s . In [17] , the protocol of [29] is implemented using mass parallelism, resulting in a system that utilizes a cluster of several hundreds of machines in parallel. Parallelism was taken a step further in [11, 10] , who designed and implemented protocols on GPUs.
The fastest published secure computation of AES based on cutand-choose on garbled circuits, that we are aware of, in the singleexecution, non-massively concurrent setting is of [2] . This implementation requires approximately 6.39 seconds for a single evaluation of AES. However, massive concurrency can drastically improve performance. Using several tens of machines (each with 8 CPU cores), AES can be computed in about 40.6 seconds for 1024 executions, with security parameter s = 80 [30] . Using GPUs, AES can be computed in only 0.46 seconds, for s = 40 [10] .
Our Contributions
We start by presenting a new technique for checking that P 1 uses the same input in all (good) garbled circuits. Our method has both theoretical and practical advantages over previous techniques. Then, we describe an optimized protocol for 2PC in the online/offline setting, based on the protocol of [23] ; our protocol uses our new consistency check, plus the state-of-the-art techniques for the other checks and additional small optimizations. We present a prototype implementation of our optimized protocol, which is the first implemented 2PC protocol based on the cut-and-choose method that requires less then s garbled circuits per 2PC computation. Last, we evaluate the prototype with different circuits and sets of parameters. We proceed to provide more details on each contribution. New P 1 's input consistency check. Previous techniques for ensuring that P 1 uses the same input in all good garbled circuits have significant disadvantages. The best known methods to date require O(s) symmetric cryptographic operations per input bit, and are due to [25] and [30] . However, it is unclear how to use the technique of [30] in the online/offline setting (when many 2PC executions are needed), and the technique of [25] is (arguably) complicated and thus very difficult to implement.
Our new solution requires O(s) symmetric cryptographic operations per garbled circuit, rather than per input bit; in most cases this is much smaller, and especially in the offline/online setting where the number of circuits per execution is very small (about 5-10 for typical parameters). In addition, our solution is very simple to describe and implement, and can be plugged-in in a modular way into most 2PC protocols (based on the cut-and-choose method), including the ones in the online/offline setting. Our protocol can be implemented using only standard cryptographic assumptions (at the expense of adding 2 exponentiations per circuit which is negligible in the overall cost) or in the random oracle model (in which case no exponentiations are needed). We remark that our new consistency check is the best option today, even for single-execution protocols. Optimized protocol in the ROM. We apply the new technique for checking P 1 's input consistency and the randomized encoding technique of [20] for protecting against selective OT attacks, to the protocol of [23] in the online/offline setting. We further optimize several parts of the protocol in the random-oracle model, including further elimination of exponentiations, reducing communication, and more.
The online stage of the protocol is highly efficient. It requires only four messages between the players and the overall communication size depends only on the input length and the security parameters. (Note that the online stage of the fastest 2PC implementation in the online/offline setting, shown in [26] , requires a number of rounds that depends on the depth of the circuit in use, and its communication size depends on the circuit size.) This is the first implemented protocol with online communication that is independent of the circuit size (and is concretely very small, as shown by our experiments). Prototype implementation and evaluation. We implemented our optimized protocol on top of the SCAPI library [9, 1] . Our prototype uses state-of-the-art techniques like AES-NI instructions, fixed-key garbling [4] , and the optimized OT-extension protocol of [3] . We evaluated the prototype on Amazon AWS machines. Performance of the online stage itself is three orders of magnitude better than previous protocols (without massive parallelism). For example, evaluating the AES circuit between two machines in the same region costs only 7 ms in the online stage. Furthermore, the offline stage costs only 74 ms per 2PC computation (for some sets of parameters). Even when the parties communicate via the Internet, the cost of the online stage remains small as our protocol requires only four rounds of communication. Specifically, we evaluated AES in 160 ms with a network roundtrip of 75 ms (so at least 150 ms is spent on communication). Observe that the offline stage itself is very competitive when compared to previous results. In particular, the sum of both the offline and online stages is far better than any single execution reported (81ms only). Thus, we do not obtain a fast online phase at the expense of a slow offline one. See Section 6 for more details and a comparison of our results with the performance of previous implementations.
PRELIMINARIES
Let H(·) denote a hash function, and commit(x) (respectively, commit(x, r)) denote a commitment to x (resp., a commitment to x using randomness r). We denote by l the length of each party's input, by In(C, x) the set of wire indexes of a boolean circuit C that correspond to a given input x, and by Out(C) the set of wire indices of the output wires of C.
Efficient Perfectly/Statistically-Hiding Extractable Commitment
Let ExtractCom(m) be a perfectly-or statistically-hiding extractable commitment. In the full version we review the perfectlyhiding extractable commitment of [18] that works in the standard model and is secure under the DDH assumption. In the randomoracle model, such commitments are easily defined by ExtractCom(m) = H(m; r) where r is random. Note that this is not perfectly hiding. However it is statistically hiding (in the random oracle model) to any algorithm who can make only a polynomial number of queries to H, and this suffices for our needs.
Adaptively-Secure Garbling
The standard security notion of garbled circuits (e.g., [21] ) deals with a static adversary, meaning that the adversary picks its input before seeing the garbled circuit. However, in the online/offline setting, inputs are chosen only in the online stage, and if we wish to send all garbled circuits in the offline stage then the static security notion does not suffice. (Note that it is possible to only commit to the garbled circuits in the offline phase. However, in order to achieve the necessary security here, the decommitment would be the same size as the circuit, resulting in significant communication.) The security of garbled circuits in the presence of an adaptive adversary was defined in [5] ; in this definition, the adversary first gets the garbled circuit and only then chooses its input. As discussed in [23] , this allows proving security in the online/offline setting, even if all garbled circuits are sent in the offline stage.
We use the method described in [23] that slightly modifies the fixed-key AES-NI garbling scheme of [4] to be adaptively secure in the random-permutation model,. Adaptive security is immediate in the (programmable) random-permutation model if P 2 (the evaluator) chooses its input in a single query. However, this is not true in case P 2 can obtain some valid input labels before all its input bits are chosen (and therefore evaluate some of the gates before the input is fully determined). This is a problem since the gates need to be "programmed" (in the random-oracle/random-permutation model) after the inputs are received. This is solved by ensuring that P 2 is unable to decrypt any gate before receiving all labels. We achieve this by having P 1 choose a random λ (of the same length as the garbled labels), and whenever P 2 should learn a label for some input bit, it actually learns the label XORed with λ . After P 2 receives all the garbled values (XORed with λ ), P 1 reveals λ , and then P 2 XORs its labels and can evaluate the circuit. (The value of λ can be viewed as part of the last label, which will be longer than the previous ones). We prove security of this method in the full version.
2.3
The Selective-OT Attack Solution of [20] A solution for the selective-OT attack, which works with any oblivious transfer in a black-box way, was presented in [20] . The solution works by encoding P 2 's input in a way that any leakage of a small portion of the bits does not reveal significant information about P 2 's input. Formally, the encoding can be carried out using a Boolean matrix E that is s-probe-resistant, as defined below. DEFINITION 2.1 (BASED ON [20, 30] ). Matrix E ∈ {0, 1} l×n for some l, n ∈ N is called s-probe-resistant for some s ∈ N if for any L ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , l}, the Hamming distance of i∈L E i is at least s, where E i denotes the i-th row of E.
Such a matrix E can be constructed with n = max(4l, 3 ), as shown in [20] . A different construction with n ≤ lg(l) + l + s + s · max(lg(4l), lg(4s)) was presented in [30] . We note that both constructions can result in a matrix E for which there exists a vector y that for all vectors y , Ey = y (meaning that some input cannot be encoded). We therefore take E to be [E |I l ] ∈ {0, 1} l×(n+l) , where E is an s-probe-resistant matrix and I l is the identity matrix of size l. E is clearly also s-probe-resistant, and now, any vector y can be encoded using a vector y that has random bits in the first n elements, and "corrections" in the rest of the bits so that Ey = y.
Instead of working with the function f (x, y), the parties work with the function f (x, y ) = f (x, Ey ) and P 2 chooses a random y such that y = Ey (this ensures that f (x, y ) = f (x, y)). As long as E is s-probe-resistant, even if P 1 learns s < s bits of y , it cannot learn any information about y. This is due to the fact that for every s < s bits of y and every y, there exists a y that is consistent with them (i.e., Ey = y and y = y on the s < s bits revealed). Now, in order to learn s bits, P 1 has to carry out a selective-OT attack on s wires. However, for every such wire it is caught with probability 1/2, which means that if it tries to attack s wires, it gets caught with probability at least 1−2 −s . In addition to working with f (x, y ), the parties can use one OT invocation for many circuits, allowing P 2 to input the same y for many circuits while learning the corresponding labels in all of them together. Therefore, the number of OTs needed is n for the entire set of evaluated circuits.
As shown in [30] , since E is a binary matrix the subcircuit that computes Ey can be garbled very efficiently using the Free-XOR technique [16] , with only O(n) symmetric-key operations. This modification requires assuming that the garbling scheme in use is secure with the Free-XOR technique (see [6] ). Moreover, assuming correlation-robust hash functions, many OTs can be implemented very efficiently (i.e., with a small number of symmetric-key operations per OT) using an efficient OT extension protocol. Specifically, the above solution can be implemented by O(n) symmetric-key operations, and only O(s) seed-OTs [3] .
Cut-and-Choose Parameters
The offline/online method for cut-and-choose uses the following parameters: (a) the number of circuits B evaluated per online 2PC; (b) the number of 2PC executions N; (c) the fraction of circuits evaluated p (and so a 1 − p fraction are checked); and (d) the statistical security parameter s. A comprehensive analysis of the soundness of the amortized cut-and-choose, with respect to the above parameters, was presented by [23] .
For completeness, we repeat the description of the cut-andchoose game in terms of balls and bins. From here on, a ball refers to a garbled circuit, and a cracked ball is an incorrect garbled circuit that was maliciously generated; a single execution in the online phase uses a full bucket of unchecked "balls". Recall that in the cheating recovery method of [19] there are actually two garbledcircuit evaluations: the main circuit for computing the function is evaluated, and a very small auxiliary circuit is computed that is used for P 2 to learn P 1 's input in case P 1 cheated. The balls and bins game is such that for the main circuit the adversary can cheat if there exists a bucket where all the balls are cracked, and for the small cheating recovery circuit the adversary can cheat if there is a bucket where a majority of the balls are cracked. P 2 chooses three parameters p, N and B, and sets M = NB p and m = NB. (Note that p < 1 and so M > m.) A potentially adversarial P 1 (who we will denote by Adv) prepares M balls and sends them to P 2 . Then, party P 2 chooses at random a subset of the balls of size M − m; these balls are checked by P 2 and if one of them is cracked then P 2 aborts. Denote the balls that are not checked by 1, . . . , m. In [23] , bounds were shown on the probabilities that P 2 does not abort and (1) there exists a fully-cracked bucket (i.e., all balls in some bucket are cracked), or (2) there exists a majority-cracked bucket (i.e., at least B/2 balls in some bucket are cracked).
When considering composition of protocols (as done in [23] ), indeed the overall cheating probability is the natural soundness one should work with. However, we believe that is it more natural to focus on the cheating probability in a single 2PC execution (especially, since this enables a direct comparison to single-execution implementations). We will therefore be interested in the probabilities that P 2 does not abort and some specific bucket is fully cracked, or, that some specific bucket is majority-cracked.
In addition to the bounds shown in [23] , a few concrete examples are presented there to exemplify that those bounds are not tight. Since we mostly care here about concrete efficiency, we implemented a program that finds the parameters analytically, based on the following tighter approximations that are derived from the analysis of [23] ; see Table 1 for results. LEMMA 2.2. Let N, B, p, M be parameters as described above. The probability that a bucket is fully-cracked is at most
LEMMA 2.3. Let N, B, p, M parameters as described above. The probability that a bucket is majority-cracked is at most
COMMITMENT WITH ZK PROOF OF DIFFERENCE
The aim of this section is to construct a commitment scheme with an efficient zero-knowledge proof of difference; we will show later how it is used to prove P 1 's input consistency. Given commit(x 1 ) and commit(x 2 ) and ∆ = x 1 ⊕ x 2 , the aim is to efficiently prove that the XOR of the decommitments is indeed ∆. Formally, one party inputs (x 1 , x 2 ), and the other party chooses to either learn x 1 ⊕ x 2 or the pair (x 1 , x 2 ) itself. (Thus, the first party is committed to the pair, and must either decommit or prove their difference, depending on P 2 's choice.) Our constructions are based on ideas of [28] .
We start by describing a basic functionality (presented in Figure 3.1), prove its correctness, and then describe how to extend it to work with many commitments so we can use it for inputconsistency checks. The detailed extended protocol appears in the full version. F Com∆ZK runs with parties P 1 and P 2 , as follows: Input: F Com∆ZK receives a pair of messages (x 1 , x 2 ) from P 1 , and a bit b from P 2 . Output: F Com∆ZK sends ∆ = x 1 ⊕ x 2 to P 2 if b = 0, and sends (x 1 , x 2 ) to P 2 if b = 1. In addition, F Com∆ZK sends b to P 1 .
The Simple Commit-and-Difference Proof Functionality
A Warm-Up -Only Two Messages
In this section, we show how to securely realize the functionality from Figure 3.1. The idea behind the construction is as follows. We define a split commitment of a value x to be a pair of commitments to random values [commit(x ⊕ r), commit(r)] whose XOR equals x. Party P 1 sends P 2 a set of s split commitments to x 1 and s split commitments to x 2 . If P 2 asks to decommit (i.e., b = 1) then P 1 simply decommits using the standard (canonical) decommiment and P 2 checks that the XORs in all split commitments to a value are the same. In contrast, if b = 0, then P 1 sends P 2 the XORs of the split commitment values. Specifically, let [commit(x 1 ⊕ r i ), commit(r i )] and [commit(x 2 ⊕ ρ i ), commit(ρ i )] be the ith split commitment of x 1 and x 2 , respectively. Then, P 1 sends δ 0 i = x 1 ⊕ r i ⊕ x 2 ⊕ ρ i and δ 1 i = r i ⊕ ρ i to P 2 , for every i = 1, . . . s, as well as ∆ = x 1 ⊕ x 2 . Observe that for every i it holds that δ 0 i ⊕ δ 1 i = x 1 ⊕ x 2 = ∆, and so P 2 checks that for every i it indeed holds that δ 0 i ⊕ δ 1 i = ∆. Then, given these values, P 2 sends a random s-bit "challenge string" W to P 1 , indicating to P 1 which value in each split commitment to open. Letting W = W 1 , . . . ,W s , party P 1 decommits to both left commitments in the ith split commitments of x 1 and x 2 if W i = 0; otherwise it decommits to both right commitments in the ith split commitments of x 1 and x 2 . Observe that if W i = 0 then P 2 receives x 1 ⊕ r i and x 2 ⊕ ρ i and so can verify that δ 0 i was correctly constructed. In contrast, if W i = 1 then P 2 receives r i and ρ i and so can check that δ 1 i was correctly constructed. Thus, if x 1 ⊕ x 2 = δ , then P 1 must cheat on at least one side of every split commitment, and so will be caught with probability 1 − 2 −s . Observe that this check is very simple and very efficient; when using a hash function to commit it requires 2s hash computations only per value.
Despite its simplicity, we remark that in order to simulate this protocol (in the sense of securely computing F Com∆ZK in the ideal/ real model paradigm), we need to have P 2 commit to its challenges b and W before the protocol begins. If an extractable commitment is used, then the simulator can learn the challenges ahead of time and therefore "cheat". Fortunately, this comes at very little overhead, as can be seen in the full protocol. See Figure 3 .2 for the detailed protocol. Proving consistency. Before proceeding to prove security, we explain how this functionality can be used to force P 1 to use the same input in two different garbled circuits. The values x 1 , x 2 are the signal bits over all of P 1 's input wires in the first and second garbled circuits, respectively. (Recall that the signal bit determines whether the keys on the wire are given in the "correct" order or reversed order. In some works this value is also called the permutation bit.) Now, P 1 provides (standard) commitments to the garbled values on these input wires (this is standard in all cut-and-choose protocols); we call them wire-commitments. However, P 1 provides the wirecommitments in the order determined by the signal bit. Now, when two circuits are opened to be checked, then P 2 provides input b = 1 to F Com∆ZK , and so all values are decommitted. This enables P 2 to check that the split commitment was constructed correctly and that the wire-commitments were indeed given in the correct order, according to the signal bits. In contrast, when two circuits are to be evaluated, then P 2 provides input b = 0 to F Com∆ZK . As a result, P 2 will receive the XOR of the signal bits in the two circuits. Thus, if the XOR equals 0, then P 2 knows that P 1 must either decommit to the first wire-commitment in both circuits or decommit to the second wire-commitment in both circuits. (Since P 2 knows that the signal bit is the same in both cases -without knowing its value -this ensures that the same input bit is used by P 1 in both.) In contrast, if the XOR equals 1, then P 2 knows that P 1 must either decommit to the first wire-commitment in the first circuit and the second wire-commitment in the second circuit, or vice versa. (Once again, since P 2 knows that the signal bit is different in both cases, this ensures that the same input bit is used by P 1 in both.)
Proof of Security
Let x ∈ {0, 1} n . Denote c ∈ SC(x) if there exists randomness so that c = SC(x); otherwise denote c / ∈ SC(x). Denote SC = {c | ∃x : c = SC(x)}; i.e., the set of all valid commitments. Denote by commit 2s the set of all series c of 2s commitments (thus SC ⊂ commit 2s ). We will be interested in commitments c ∈ SC versus commitments c ∈ commit 2s \ SC. Note that since commit is perfectly binding, these sets are well defined.
In the full version, we prove that the proof in Protocol 3.2 (for b = 0) is an interactive proof for the promise problem (P, Q), where
, and
The promise problem (P, Q) considers the question of whether an input (c, d, ∆) ∈ Q, under the promise that (c, d, ∆) ∈ P. In words, Inputs: P 1 has a pair (x 1 , x 2 ) and P 2 has a bit b.
Commit to Challenge: P 2 chooses a random W ∈ {0, 1} s . Then, P 1 and P 2 run a perfectly (or statistically) hiding extractable commitment scheme ExtractCom, in which P 2 commits to b and W . (A Pedersen commitment with a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the committed value suffices, or a simple hash with a random string in the random oracle model.) Commit to x 1 , x 2 : Define the split commitment SCom(x k , r) = [commit(x ⊕ r), commit(r)]. Then:
1. For i = 1, . . . , s, P 1 chooses r i , ρ i ← {0, 1} n and computes c 0 i , r 1 ) , . . . , SCom(x 1 , r s ) and c 2 = SC(x 2 ) = SCom(x 2 , ρ 1 ) , . . . , SCom(x 2 , ρ s ) .
and ∆ = x 1 ⊕ x 2 to P 2 , who checks that for every i it holds that δ 0 i ⊕ δ 1 i = ∆. 3. P 2 decommits to W = W 1 , . . . ,W s .
For
6. If all checks pass, then P 2 outputs ∆.
we are given an input (c, d, ∆) and we are guaranteed that there exist x 1 , x 2 such that c ∈ SC(x 1 ) and d ∈ SC(x 2 ). The "aim" is then just to determine if x 1 ⊕ x 2 = ∆ or x 1 ⊕ x 2 = ∆. (Note that if c and d are such that they are not valid commitments at all, then this will be detected in the checks carried out in the cut-and-choose protocol; i.e., when b = 1.)
We follow the definition of [12] regarding interactive proofs for promise problems. Informally, completeness must hold for every (c, d, ∆) ∈ P ∩ Q, soundness guarantees that the verifier will reject for any (c, d, ∆) ∈ P \ Q, and nothing is required for (c, d, ∆) / ∈ P. In addition to the above, we prove that Protocol 3.2 securely computes the functionality F Com∆ZK , defined in Figure 3 .1, in the presence of a corrupt P 2 . We stress that in the case that P 1 is corrupted we rely on the soundness property of the proof (since Protocol 3.2 does not securely compute F Com∆ZK in the presence of a corrupt P 1 ).
In the full version we prove the following:
If commit is a perfectly-binding commitment scheme and ExtractCom is a perfectly-hiding extractable commitment scheme, then the commitment phase of Protocol 3.2 is a perfectly-binding commitment scheme, and the proof phase is an interactive proof system for the promise problem (P, Q) defined above. In addition, Protocol 3.2 securely computes F Com∆ZK in the presence of a corrupt P 2 .
Replacing the Perfectly-Binding Commitment
Note that so far we have assumed that commit(·) is a perfectlybinding commitment. In practice, perfectly-binding commitments are less efficient than computationally binding ones. For example, with an appropriate assumption on the cryptographic hash function, commit(x) = H(x; r) is a computationally binding and computationally hiding commitment. If we model H as a random oracle, then commit is still only computationally binding. However, it is extractable, and thus we can prove the interactive proof of Protocol 3.2 to be a proof of knowledge. This achieves the same effect as soundness. (Note that once we model H as a random oracle, we can also use it as the statistically-hiding extractable commitment.)
In order to use any computationally-binding commitments, including like that above but without resorting to the random oracle model, the following change can be made to Protocol 3.2. Let σ be a seed to a pseudorandom generator G, and define SC(x) as (i.e., SC(x) = SCom(x, r 1 ), . . . , SCom(x, r s ) ) where the underlying commitment uses H, but all of the randomness in generating SC is taken from G(σ ), and a perfectly-binding extractable commitment is given to σ alone. This has the advantage that a single perfectly-binding commitment to a short string suffices to define all of SC as perfectly binding. The promise problem used to model the interactive proof, and the proof of soundness then remains the same (with the additional requirement that P 1 is polynomial time and cannot efficiently open any of the individual commitments to anything else). This adds one extractable commitment per circuit (which can be implemented via El Gamal and so costs 2 exponentiations per circuit), plus a single zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the El Gamal private key generated by P 1 (that is done only once for all circuits and costs just 9 exponentiations).
Extending to Many Messages
The functionality of Figure 3 .1 works with only two messages from P 1 (and so only for two circuits). We would like to use it for a larger number of messages, where P 2 can choose any subset of them to be revealed and learn the XOR differences between the remaining ones (as in the cut-and-choose case where a random subset of the circuits are evaluated and consistency must be proved for them). In addition, for our online/offline 2PC protocol we would like P 2 to be able to pick different subsets of the unrevealed messages, and learn the XOR differences for all the messages in each subset (in the online/offline setting, the evaluated circuits are randomly thrown into buckets and each bucket is used for a different execution; thus the XOR differences is needed inside each bucket).
The extended functionality is defined in Figure 3 .4. The subsets I 1 , . . . , I N are the buckets of circuits to be evaluated in the online phase (each bucket is of size B). Thus, P 2 learns the XOR differences between every pair in each bucket; this enables it to verify consistency as described above. Observe that the indices of values not in any of I 1 , . . . , I N are circuits that are checked; thus, the values corresponding with these indices are revealed.
The main difference between the protocol that securely computes the extended functionality in Figure 3 .4 and the protocol in Fig-ure 3.2 is that in the general case, P 2 commits to all of the subsets I 1 , . . . , I N initially (and not just a single bit b). The detailed protocol appears in the full version. The Extended Commit-and-Difference Proof Functionality
Using F ExCom∆ZK in Cut-and-Choose
As we have mentioned, for every circuit in the cut-and-choose, P 1 commits to the string m which contains all of the "signal" bits σ on its input wires (this requires 2s basic commitments commit). In addition, the input garbled labels are committed; the commitments are in the correct order (with the 0 label first) if σ = 0, and in the opposite order if σ = 1. When checking a circuit, these commitments are also verified. For the evaluation circuits, let gc 1 , . . . , gc l be the circuits to be evaluated, and let m 1 , . . . , m l be their committed signal bit labels. Then, for every i = 1, . . . , l, party P 1 sends P 2 the stringx i = m i ⊕x, where x is its input to the secure computation. In addition, for every i = 1, . . . , l − 1, it defines ∆ i =x i ⊕x i+1 and proves that m i ⊕ m i+1 = ∆ i (using F ExCom∆ZK ). The overall cost is 2s basic commitments commit per circuit plus two extractable commitments, which is very cheap. Advantages Over Previous Input Consistency Proofs. Note that the number of commitments in Protocol 3.2 is only 2s for every circuit. In the online/offline setting, the number of circuits is very small (typically 5-10, depending on the parameters) and thus this costs significantly less than a single commitment per input bit (unless the input is very small). When commit is implemented as described above using computationally-binding commitment, the resulting protocol is more efficient than those of [25, 30] , and significantly more simple to understand and implement. From a theoretical standpoint, our protocol can also be based on very standard assumptions (though with the additional negligible overhead of the two exponentiations needed by the El Gamal encryption used to implement a perfectly-binding commitment), whereas [25] requires correlation robustness and [30] requires Free-XOR.
Another advantage of our new consistency check is for amortized cut-and-choose protocols like [15, 23] in the online/offline setting. Both works use inefficient solutions for the input-consistency issue (i.e., using discrete-log ZK proofs). It is unclear how to adapt those results to work with the protocol of [30] (when P 1 has many different inputs). Note that [23] mentions that its protocol can be adapted to work with the protocol [25] . However, the resulting protocol seems to be very complicated and difficult to implement. We believe that simplicity is a very important factor for secure protocols, and we find our solution to be more simple to describe and implement than the one of [25] .
OPTIMIZED 2PC IN THE ONLINE/ OF-FLINE SETTING
We base our protocol on the results of [23] , where a protocol for multiple 2PCs in the online/offline model is shown. First, we adapt it to use the technique of [20, 25, 30] for protecting against selective-OT attacks. Next, we plug in our new technique for checking P 1 's input consistency as discussed in Section 3.3. These two modifications essentially replace all the exponentiations required by the protocol of [23] for the input wires with cheaper cryptographic operations (and a small number of exponentiations that is independent of the input size).
Since our goal is to minimize the cost of the online stage, we chose to work in the random-oracle model, so we could construct adaptively secure garbled circuits in an efficient way. We therefore further utilize the power of the random-oracle model and optimize other parts of the protocol. For example, we replace all extractable commitments (that require exponentiations) with randomoracle based commitments (that requires only hash function calls), and we reduce the number of encryptions needed for the cheating recovery method presented in [23] .
The protocol is described in Appendix A in Figures A.2 We remark that the protocol can be slightly modified to be secure given an adaptively secure garbling scheme and without utilizing the random oracle for commit and ExtractCom. The only modification needed is to commit on all the commitments of the input labels using a trapdoor commitment, so that in the simulation in case P 1 is corrupted, the simulator could change the commitments on the input labels after it learns P 1 's input. The cost of this modification is small -only one additional trapdoor commitment per garbled circuit.
PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
Our goal is to provide an end-to-end system for multiple 2PC executions in the online/offline setting. First, the system can provide the user very good sets of parameters. Next, the system is optimized both crypto-wise (e.g., using the random-oracle where suitable) and engineering-wise (e.g., using parallelism where possible). Some key parts of the system are the following:
Additional optimizations in the random-oracle model. First, recall that everywhere we use an extractable commitment, we actually use commit(x; r) = H(x; r). Second, since the labels of P 2 's input wires are random, we can use a second random-oracle H 2 , and ask P 1 to commit on label W just by sending H 2 (W ). This reduces P 1 's inputs to the OTs by a factor of two, and still preserves security as H 2 (W ) does not reveal any information about W if W has enough entropy (which happens in our case, as W is at least 80 bits long random string).
Finding good parameters. We implemented a program that is given the values of s (statistical security parameter) and N (the overall number of executions desired), and calculates the parameters (based on Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3) that minimize the overall number of circuits (to minimize the run-time of the offline stage) or the number of evaluation circuits per bucket (to minimize the run-time of the online stage). Similarly to what was observed by [23] , the parameters we get are much better than what the upper bounds of [23] give. See Table 1 Table 1 : Several sets of parameters for Lemma 2.2 with s = 40 (left) and s = 80 (right). Note the tradeoff between the total number of circuits (which affects the offline stage efficiency) and the number of evaluation circuits per bucket (which affects the online stage efficiency).
the cut-and-choose of C. We also implemented a program that receives a circuit C and calculates the encoding matrices E and E , used for protecting P 2 's input from selective-OT attacks. In contrast to [23] , we have set the statistical security parameter s to be such that the probability that an adversary cheats in a single 2PC execution is 2 −s . (In [23] , they set 2 −s to be the probability that an adversary cheats in at least one of the many executions overall). Indeed, this is merely a different way of looking at the parameters, but we believe that for most users, considering security of a single execution is more natural. Handling large inputs. Calculating a probe-resistant matrix according to the algorithm of [30] is a very computation intensive task when the input is large (e.g., 1000-bit long). Instead, when dealing with long inputs, our system constructs the probe-resistant matrix using a composition of smaller probe-resistant matrices (such that each can be generated very efficiently). While this method results in a slightly larger matrix used in the protocol (and, thus, more OTs), it dramatically reduces the time needed for generating the probe-resistant matrix (from hours to seconds). Architecture. We use the SCAPI library [9, 1] for implementing the high-level steps of the protocols, while using more optimized C/C++ code for steps that are more computation intensive (e.g., computing the large amount of XORs of the probe-resistant matrix). We use the OT-extension implementation of [3] , a new SCAPI garbling library that uses fixed-key AES for garbling, as suggested by [4] , and the SCAPI wrapper of OpenSSL for AES and SHA-1.
The prototype is able to generate and evaluate many garbled circuits (and carry out other operations) in parallel, using multiple threads. In addition, before the online stage begins, all relevant files are loaded to memory so once the interaction starts, no I/O delays occur. (We do not include disk I/O time in our measurements as in practice loading to memory should always occur before actual inputs are received )
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Setup. We ran the prototype on two types of Amazon AWS instances: c4.8xlarge (with 64GB RAM and 36 virtual 2.9GHz CPUs) and c4.2xlarge (with 15GB RAM and 8 virtual 2.9GHz CPUs). On both instances, garbling 1000 AES circuits in isolation took about 470 ms. Unless stated otherwise, all the tests in this section were ran on the c4.8xlarge instances. We ran tests with LAN configuration, where both parties were in the same AWS region and the roundtrip was less than 1 ms, and with a WAN configuration, where the parties were in different regions (specifically, eu-west and useast) and the roundtrip was 75 ms.
We tested the prototype with the following circuits: (1) ADD: receives two 32-bit integers and outputs their sum (the circuit has 127 AND gates); (2) AES: receives two 128-bit inputs and outputs the encryption of the first input using the second input as the key (the circuit has 6800 AND gates); (3) SHA-1: receives two 256-bit inputs and outputs the SHA-1 hash digest of the XOR of the two inputs (the circuit has 37300 AND gates); (4) SHA-256: receives two 256-bit inputs and outputs the SHA-256 hash digest of the XOR of the two inputs (the circuit has 90825 AND gates).
Results. In the following, all experiments use the sets of parameters from Table 1 , and unless said otherwise, s = 40. See Table 2 for the results of the implementation on these circuits; the online time given is the average over all executions. We can see that, for example, the total time it takes to evaluate a single AES (i.e.. the sum of the online and offline stages timings) ranges from around 210ms (for N = 32) to around 80ms (for N = 1024). See Table 3 for results with s = 80. In Table 4 we show an example of the effect of the number of threads on the offline stage performance. Even though performance is far from linear in the number of threads, it is clear that parallelism helps, and we expect that further optimizations utilizing multithreading will further improve performance. We also ran these experiments for other settings and verified that this effect is consistent. (For s = 80, the numbers are about 2-2.5 times larger.)
As discussed earlier, there is a tradeoff between the total number of circuits and the number of evaluation circuits per online stage. This affects the performance of the two stages. See Table 1 for examples of those tradeoffs. In addition to the tests described in Table 2 , we also tested how this tradeoff is reflected in practice: Instead of running AES with s = 80, N = 128 and bucket size 12, we ran it with bucket size 10 which increases the total number of circuits from 1995 to 2246; the offline running time was 310 ms per 2PC (with 9 threads) and the online running time was 31/16/17 ms for 1/5/9 threads (respectively). This is about 13% slower in the offline phase and around 10% faster in the online phase, which roughly matches the differences in the numbers of circuits and so is as expected. Thus, it is possible to obtain different tradeoffs, depending on whether it is more important to reduce the overall cost or the online latency.
We also tested the prototype in the WAN configuration, since in many real-world scenarios the participating parties may be far apart. Note that in these scenarios, the Yao-based approach has a significant advantage over TinyOT [26] and SPDZ [7] who have a number of rounds that depends on the circuit depth. See Tables 5, 6 and 4 for the results of those tests. We note that our online phase requires four rounds of interaction (two messages in each direction), and since the roundtrip in our WAN configuration is 75 ms, the cost of our online stage cannot go below 150 ms. Our tests show that in this case, the majority of the time spent is on communication, and the cost of the actual steps of our protocol (i.e., excluding communication) is very low. We remark that protocols which require a Table 2 : Running times of the different circuits in LAN configuration (in ms). For N = 32 we use buckets of 7 circuits of C and 20 of C ; for N = 128 we use buckets of 6 circuits of C and 14 of C ; for N = 1024 we use buckets of 4 circuits of C and 10 of C (C is the main circuit and C is the auxiliary cheating-recovery circuit). Offline times are for execution with 9 threads. Table 3 : Running times for AES circuit in LAN configuration for s = 80. For N = 32 we use buckets of 15 circuits of C and 46 of C ; for N = 128 we use buckets of 12 circuits of C and 28 of C ; for N = 1024 we use buckets of 9 circuits of C and 20 of C . round of communication for every level of the circuit in the online phase will perform poorly in this scenario. (For example, the best AES circuit has depth 50 and thus the online time will not be able to be less than 3750 ms in this setting.) Last, we tested the prototype on a weaker AWS instance, i.e., c4.2xlarge, for computation of AES. See Table 7 . As expected, performance is mostly worse than on the stronger instance but for some parameters they are still very close. This is mainly because of memory issues, and thus is mostly reflected in the offline stage (our current implementation of the offline stage stores many garbled circuits in memory). Indeed, the online times are almost the same. Comparison with related work. We focus here on comparing our results with the ones reported by previous works. We leave the comprehensive benchmarking of all relevant protocols using similar hardware, network configuration, and so on to future work.
As discussed in Section 1, the fastest published implementation of cut-and-choose based 2PC on standard machines (without massive parallelism) is of [2] which requires more than 6 seconds for a single secure computation of AES. In, [30, 10] , it is shown how to reduce costs drastically using massive parallelism, requiring only several tens of ms per 2PC invoked. Note, however, that our protocol works in the online/offline setting, while [2, 10] work in the single-execution setting and [30] works in the batch setting. Still, we believe that it is clear that our prototype costs several orders of magnitude less than previous non-massively parallel implementations, and has the potential to cost much less in the massively parallel setting (since all the expensive steps of the protocol can be done in parallel). We stress that the offline/online setting is preferable to the batch setting since online executions can be run in isolation.
Different 2PC protocols, that are not based on the cut-and-choose technique for garbled circuits, are presented in [26] and [7] . Both protocols have an offline stage in which the parties work independently of their inputs, and a much shorter online stage in which the players use their inputs and compute the function of interest. The cryptographic work required by these protocols during the online stage is very small (if any), however, both protocols require a number of interaction rounds that depends on the depth of the circuit being evaluated.
The overall online stage of [26] costs 4 seconds (for a single computation) for computing AES, while the offline is at least 1 second (even when amortized for many computations). For many computations (135), the total online time is 15 seconds. This gives a low amortized time, but high latency. The average total running time (i.e., the sum of the offline and online timings for a single AES computation) is at least 1.6 seconds (for all numbers tested in [26] ). In [8] , optimizations and improvements were made to [26] that enables running many AES executions in parallel. The best results obtained there provide an online time of 9962 ms for 680 AES operations in parallel. This yields a low average cost (about 14 ms per AES), but a high latency. The online time for a single execution is expected to be similar to [26] . Regarding [7] , the cost of the offline stage for computing AES is about 156 seconds and the cost of the online stage (with 50 rounds of communication) is about 20 ms [31] . However, both [26] and [7] have many rounds of communication; thus in slower networks (e.g., between different Amazon regions) they will perform poorly.
We note that in [26] and [7] , the offline stage is independent of the circuit being evaluated in the online stage, whereas in our Table 5 : Running times of AES and SHA-1 in WAN configuration using the parameters of Table 2 (in ms) for s = 40. The roundtrip between the parties was 75 ms.
protocol, a single circuit is fixed for all computations. Thus, they are better suited for settings in which the function to be computed is not known ahead of times. In addition, [7] has two significant advantages over our protocol: (1) it can work with more than two parties, and (2) it can work with arithmetic circuits, which for some types of computations is more efficient.
CONCLUSION
The first evaluation of cut-and-choose based 2PC was presented in [27] in 2009. It required 1114 seconds for a single computation of AES. Since then, many algorithmic and engineering improvements have been presented, gradually reducing the cost of AES computation to 264 seconds [29] , to 6 seconds [2] , and to even 1.4 seconds [17] and 0.46 seconds [10] when using massive parallelism. This work continues this line of work and shows how the costs can be further reduced using recent and new algorithmic improvements (though in a slightly different, yet very natural setting). When preprocessing 1024 executions, the average online time is less than 10 ms and the amortized offline time is only 74 ms. As we use most state-of-the-art techniques (e.g., the protocol of [23] , the garbling scheme of [4] , and the OT extension of [3] ), these timings are the result of incredible work carried out by the community on all aspects of the protocol, together with our new consistency check. We find these results to be exciting as they are more than four orders of magnitude better than the one of [27] , carried out just 6 years ago.
We believe that our results can be further improved using better multithreading, and are currently working on modifying our prototype to use multiple cores and even machines in parallel (in a similar manner to the work of [17] ). We leave the goal of optimizing and evaluating our protocol for GPUs for future work.
• The parties decide on two circuits: (1) A circuit C x, y (1) , y (2) that computes f x, (Ey (1) ) ⊕ y (2) , with y (2) being public-input wires.
(2) A cheatingrecovery circuit C (x, D, d (1) , d (2) ) that computes (2) ) ? x | 0 , with d (2) and D being public-input wires. E and E are chosen at random by P 2 as discussed in Section 2.3. For simplicity of the description here, we require that both circuits are constructed as described in Section 2.3 so that the value of Ey (1) (or E d (1) ) remains private even if s − 1 bits of y (1) (or d (1) ) are revealed.
Running the cut-and-choose for C and for C :
• The parties run the cut-and-choose sub protocol from Fig- ure A.1 with the circuit C and parameters p, N and B.
• The parties run the cut-and-choose sub protocol from Figure A.1 with the circuit C and parameters p , N and B . (Note that the same N is used in both cut-and-choose, so both result in the same number of buckets.) FIGURE A.2 (THE OFFLINE STAGE (CONTINUED) AND SUB-PROTOCOLS).
The Offline Stage -Continued
Running the cut-and-choose for C and for C (cont.): We chose to simplify the description by using the cut-and-choose as a sub-protocol. However, the calls to F ExCom∆ZK for the masks of C and C must be done together since P 2 should learn the XORs of the masks for the circuits that are placed in the same bucket. In the proof, we assume that the steps of the two cut-and-choose sub protocols are done in parallel, and thus the calls to F ExCom∆ZK can be done together.
From now on, we refer to the elements of the second cut-and-choose with prime. E.g. π is the mapping function of the second execution from above (while π is of the first one). Also, denote the remaining garbled circuits according to their placement by π, i.e. let gc j,i be the ith circuit of the jth bucket (for j = 1, . . . , N and i = 1, . . . , B).
Running OTs for C and for C :
• P 2 chooses y
1 , . . . , y
N ∈ R {0, 1} |y (1) | , and d
N ∈ R {0, 1} |d (1) | .
• P 1 acts as the sender in F ot and P 2 as the receiver. For bucket j = 1, . . . , N, the parties execute |y (1) | OTs, in which in the ith OT P 2 inputs the ith bit of y (1) j , and P 1 inputs the set of labels that correspond to 0 in the ith bit, and the set of labels that correspond to 1, both concatenated with their decommitments related to lc-s. (Recall that the labels are XORed with λ j .)
The players do the same for circuit C , where P 2 inputs the bits of d Storing buckets for the online stage: For bucket j = 1, . . . , N:
• P 1 stores (seed j,i , m j,i , lc j,i , ld j,i , λ j,i ) for i = 1, . . . , B, and similarly for all the bundles of C .
• P 2 stores y (1) j , lc j,i and gc j,i for i = 1, . . . , B. In addition, it stores the labels it has received for its input y (1) j from the OTs, the values of ∆ j , and similarly for all the bundles of C .
Creating a Garbled-Circuit Bundle Public Parameters:
• A circuit C(x, y (1) , y (2) ) with y (2) being public-input wires, or, a circuit C(x, D, y (1) , y (2) ) with D, y (2) being public-input wires Constructing the bundle:
• Pick a seed seed ∈ R {0, 1} k . All the randomness needed in the next steps is derived from PRF seed (·). Pick m ∈ R {0, 1} |x| .
• Construct a garbled circuit gc in which the output-wire labels are the actual output bits concatenated with random labels. (E.g., the output label for bit zero is 0|l where l ∈ R {0, 1} k ). We use an adaptively-secure garbling scheme as discussed in Section 2.2, in which all input-wire labels are XORed with λ .
• Commit to x's input-wire labels, permuted according to m, by i, commit(λ ⊕W .
• Commit to all input-wire labels of y (1) and y (2) by (i, commit(λ ⊕W 0 i ), commit(λ ⊕W 1 i )) i∈In(C,y (1) )∪In(C,y (2) ) .
• If D is an input to the circuit, commit to all input-wire labels of D by (i, commit(λ ⊕W 0 i ), commit(λ ⊕W 1 i )) i∈In(C,D) .
• Commit to all output-wire labels by commit {i,W 0 i ,W 1 i } i∈Out(C) .
• Let lc be the union of the above sets of label commitments, and let ld be the set of all the corresponding decommitments.
• Output (gc, lc; seed, ld, m, λ ).
The Cut-and-Choose Mechanism Public parameters:
• Let s, N, B ∈ N and p ∈ (0, 1) parameters. Let M = NB p . (Assume no rounding of M is needed.) Denote the circuit by C. Picking the cut, the buckets, and the offline inputs:
• The cut: P 2 sets σ to be a random string of length M that has exactly NB ones.
• The mapping: P 2 picks a PRF seed seed π and uses PRF seedπ (·) to compute a mapping function π : [N · B] → [N] that maps exactly B elements to each bucket. Define π σ : [M] → [N] to be the function that maps an index j that is the ith non-zero bit in σ to π(i). Let B i be the set { j|π σ ( j) = i} for i = 1, . . . , N.
• P 2 commits on σ and seed π using ExtractCom(·).
The cut-and-choose:
• P 1 runs the garbled-circuit bundle procedure above with the circuit C, and receives (gc j , lc j ; seed j , ld j , m j , λ j ), for j = 1, . . . , M.
• P 1 sends gc 1 , . . . , gc M and lc 1 , . . . , lc M , and commits on their seeds and λ s by ExtractCom(seed 1 ), . . . , ExtractCom(seed M ) and ExtractCom(λ 1 ), . . . , ExtractCom(λ M ).
• P 2 inputs to F ExCom∆ZK the sets B i , for i = 1, . . . , N, while P 1 inputs the values m 1 , . . . , m M . P 2 learns the sets ∆ i for each bucket, whereas P 1 learns sets B i -s.
• P 2 decommits σ and seed π . P 1 verifies that they are consistent with J and the B i -s received in the last step.
• Let J be the indexes that did not appear in any B i . For j ∈ J, P 1 asks F ExCom∆ZK to reveal m j , and in addition decommits seed j and λ j .
• P 2 computes the set {gc i , lc i } j∈J using the seeds it received and verifies that everything is correct. We focus here on a single 2PC with a single bucket. For simplicity, we omit the bucket index j when we refer to its garbled circuits, etc.
Private inputs: P 1 's input is x. P 2 's input is y.
Evaluating C:
• P 2 sends y (2) = y ⊕ y
j E.
• P 1 sends x 1 = x ⊕ m 1 .
• For i = 1, . . . , B, -P 1 decommits λ i .
-P 1 sends the input-wire labels for y (2) and for x i = x 1 ⊕m 1 ⊕m i in gc i , and the decommitments of those labels for the corresponding commitments in lc i . (Recall that P 2 knows m 1 ⊕ m i from ∆ j , thus, can compute the value of x i by itself.)
• P 1 picks D ∈ R {0, 1} k .
• For v ∈ Out(C),
-P 1 chooses R v ∈ R {0, 1} k .
-Let W b i,v be the b-th label of output wire v of gc i , where v ∈ Out(C).
. . , B.
• P 1 sends H(D).
• P 2 evaluates gc i , for i = 1, . . . , B, and then uses the output wire labels to "decrypt" the associated R v and R v ⊕ D values. In case it learns both R v and R v ⊕ D for some output wire, it checks if the XOR of them is indeed D (by applying H(·) and comparing with the value that P 1 has sent). If so, it sets d to D. Otherwise, it sets d ∈ {0, 1} s .
• If all evaluations (that ended) returned the same output, set z to be that output.
Evaluating C :
• Let d (1) the input that P 2 used in the OTs for circuit C in bucket j. P 2 sends d (2) = d ⊕ d (1) E .
• P 1 sends D, and for i = 1, . . . B , and:
-P 1 decommits λ i .
-Sends the labels that correspond to D and d (2) in gc i , and decommits the corresponding commitments from lc i .
-Sends the input-wire labels for x i = x 1 ⊕m 1 ⊕m i in gc i , and the decommitments of those labels for the corresponding commitments in lc i . (Again, recall that P 2 knows m 1 ⊕ m i from ∆ j .)
• P 1 decommits the commitments on the output labels of gc i , for i = 1, . . . B (i.e. revealing all output wire labels of the garbled circuits for C).
• P 2 verifies all decommitments, all the value W 0 i,v ⊕ R v ,W 1 i,v ⊕ R v ⊕ D, for i = 1, . . . , B and v ∈ Out(C), and the hash H(D), and aborts if there is a problem.
• P 2 evaluates gc i , for i = 1, . . . B , and takes the majority output to bex. P 2 's output:
• If all evaluation circuits of C returned the same output z, then P 2 outputs z.
• Else, if P 2 has learned earlier d such that H(d) = H(D), then it outputs f (x, y).
• Else, let gc i be a circuit for which all the output labels that P 2 received from its evaluation were also the labels that were decommitted earlier from lc i . P 2 outputs the output of gc i .
